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INFERENTIAL AND COUNTER-INFERENTIAL GRAMMATICAL 
MARKERS IN SW AHILI DIALOGUE· 
THOMAS BEARTH 
1. Introduction 
Naturally occuuing dialogue is by far the most fiequent manifestation of human speech and 
therefore has a legitimate claim to being regarded as a prime ol:lject of study in the sciences of 
language .. Looking at the factors which determine the structure ofnatmal dialogue, one cannot 
escape the conchtsion that not only what is being said but also what is being infened fiom what 
is said contributes towards determining the sequence and content of moves as well as the 
choice of granmratical featmes which are crucial for dialogue cohesion and for the 
interpretation of utterances in dialogue: "Constellations of surface featmes of message form 
are the means by which speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how 
semantic content is to be understood and how each sentence relates to what precedes 01 
follows. These featmes are refened to as contextualization cues. [ .. .] Roughly speaking, a 
contextualization cue is any featme of linguistic form that contributes to the signalling of 
contextual presupposition n ( Gumperz 1982: 131 )I 
We may, of comse, choose to ignore the linguistic dimension of the "unsaid" and stick to 
what is represented on the surface.. It conld be argued that we are on the safe side 
methodologically in avoiding the slippery grounds of speculation about implied meaning and 
sul:ljective interpretation There are, however, a number of problems with this sort of 
positivistic stance .. One such problem, and not the least, is that many overt properties of 
sentences occmring in natmal dialogue cannot be accounted for without reference to their 
relation to such non-referential categories as presupposition, expectancy, inference, and 
implicatme. 
* Research for this paper was carried out under grant nr 12-43377 95 from the Swiss National Science 
Foundation as part of the project "Topic, focus and countervalue- a discourse typological study". An earlier 
version was read at the lOth Intemational Swahili Colloquium in Bayreuth, May 10-12, 1997 I thank Prof 
W. Schicho for methodological comments on the orally presented paper and lie phi!. Karin Geitlinger for 
helpful comments on the final version. I thank Salim A Rashid, Mwanaisha J Khamis and Abdulla M 
Mzee for providing simulations of spoken dialogue for instrumental analysis. Finally, I want to thank Prof 
A Hurskainen, Helsinki, for permission to access and use the electronic database of Swahili texts 
constituted under his direction 
1 Quoted in Verschueren et al (1995:337) 
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2. The notion of inference 
Inferences - in the nanower and predominant use of the term - are not included in the semantic 
representation of the utterance but are derived from it2 Nevertheless, inferences share certain 
fundamental semantic and pragmatic properties with overtly represented propositions: being 
themselves propositional in nature, they take truth values, and they are subject to negotiation 
between dialogue partners .. On the other hand, inferences are rather unlike overt statements as 
to the conditions under which they are cancellable3 This latter fact presumably accounts, in 
part at least, for the specific kind of grammatical marking to which inferential operations on 
disc our se units give rise 4 
In a broader logico-semantic sense, the notion of "inference" may also subsume explicitly 
verbalised propositions which are derived by reasoning from some stated or unstated premise5 
As we shall see, inferential and counter-inferential markers are used in Swahili in those cases 
where inferences become subject to negotiation and therefore need to be made explicit. In the 
following discussion of these cases, the context will make it clear where the term "inference" is 
being used in the nanower sense - which is close to that of conversational implicature -, and 
where it is being used in the latter, more explicit sense. 
Inferential processes may be analysed into three phases: (1) the emergence of a verbal or 
non-verbal trigger (the source of the inference) as part of ongoing discourse activity, (2) the 
mediating phase (the single verbal utterance or the verbal exchange carrying the inferential 
operation), and (3) the target (the inferential proposition which the speaker intends to be 
accepted by the addressee )6 
Inferential processes are an essential part of what is going on in verbal exchange between 
dialogue partners .. Due, among other things, to the inherent underdetermination of lexical 
2 This corresponds to BuJlmann's (1990) definition of "Inferenz" which subsnmes all types of prepositional 
meanings communicated by an utterance but not included in its semantic representation 
3 Levinson (1983:128-134) treats inference as (partially) synonymous with implicature In fact, it is difficult 
to see how it could be systematically distinguished from the notion of conversational implicature as used in 
the Gricean tradition 
4 Radical versions of praguratic theories have tended to call into question the legitimacy of "literal meaning" 
and consequently of the dichotomy between what is said and what is being inferred. From this perspective, 
any meaning is "inferential" Thus, even a plain statement may be considered to be based on some sort of 
inference (e.g. from an observed fact), and in turn requires the hearer to derive its meaning by an inferential 
operation (see Levinson 1983, eh. 55, on this question; see also Sperber & Wilson 1995, 176ff) While it 
must be admitted that the distinction is not easy to establish on theoretical grounds, it is one which most 
obviously is made by the speakers themselves and is highly relevant to successful everyday communication. 
Perhaps the most frequently asked metadiscursive question "What did he/she mean when he/s'he said p"? 
presupposes the pragmatic reality of the distinction between overtly stated discourse and inferences drawn 
from it, and its relevance for understanding natural discourse 
5 This corresponds to BuJlmann's (1990) definition of "Inferential" -any utterance which is characterized as 
being derived from some stated oder unstated premise 
6 Delahunty (1995:347) similarly proposes a three-part dialogue-analytical framework for describing 
inferential processes: " . many of these sequences may be analysed as composed of three parts. The first 
part consists of a context which prompts a denial from the speaker, the second (which may be a negative 
inferential) rejects a proposition as either not true or not locally relevant; and the third (positive inferential) 
introduces a proposition which contrasts with the second in being presented by the speaker as true or 
relevant, or provides the narrator's reasons for rejecting the proposition in the second part In all cases the 
interpretation of the inferential reqnires reference to the local context " 
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meaning, any discomse constituent is open to a broad an ay of interpretations and - from the 
perspective of the speaker's communicative intentions - of potential misinterpretations It is 
tme that the range of interpretations open for consideration in a given stretch of speech is 
constrained by metacommunicative principles of which the most imp01tant is the postulate of 
cohesion, i.e .. the requirement that any valid hypothesis concerning the meaning of a stretch of 
discoUise 01 a segment of dialogue should be interpretable as a contribution to some statable 
global meaning of the discoUise or verbal interaction as a whole. However, it would be wrong 
to think of the specific content of an inference as following automatically from the application 
of such general principles, n01 as being something entirely left to the hearer. NatUial discoUise 
provides ample evidence to the effect that the speaker not only intends the hearer to select 
certain possible interpretations rather than others but actively monitors the inferential 
processes leading to the intended interpretation. Management of inferences as a "parallel 
activity" of discoUise production may be expected to be reflected, under certain conditions, in 
f01mal properties of the discomse itself 7 
3. Matching inferences and the infer·ential gap condition 
Ideally, speakers may be assumed to plan their contribution to dialogue in such a way as to 
trigger in their audience those inferences which will match their communicative intentions .. This 
would seem to follow from basic axioms of a Gricean view of conversation such as the co-
operative principle 01 the maxim of quaniity F01 instance, the first part of the latter maxim is 
(Grice 1975:45; cf Levinson 1983: 104): "Make yom contribution as inf01mative as is required 
(for the CUirent pUipose of the exchange)" It p01trays an ideal speaker who, in phrasing his 
contribution, assumes having anticipated all the variables determining the hearer's 
interpretation of the utterance, and who is fully confident that this interpretation will indeed 
match his intentions in acc01dance with "the cmrent pUipose of exchange" This basic 
confidence in the effectiveness of one's own speech (as anrazing as it is, given the well known 
hazards accompanying verbal exchange between hUill3lls) is undoubtedly a premise which 
prevails in the exercise of everyday dialogue interaction. The case where the generation of 
matching inferences is thus taken for granted may be considered as the "default case" of 
inferential discomse activity Under this assumption, inferential processes- whether objectively 
successful in terms of speaker intentions or not - will not n01mally be noticed by the 
participants, and theref01e will not give rise to any s01t of special marking. 
It seems that the Gricean the01y of conversation, notwithstanding the provision which it 
makes for the effects resulting from calculated violations of the maxims, is only capable of 
dealing with the default case. However: (i) hearer inferences do not always match the speaker's 
7 An interesting trace of this monitoring activity is afterthought (also known as antitopic or right-
detachment) which serves to secure unambiguous identification of referents (Lambrecht 1994:202f!') 
Afterthought in this sense (which I believe is only one of various possible discourse functions of right-
dislocation in Swahili, cf. Bearth 1995a) typically occurs as a result of speaker-internal auto-feedback rather 
than as a reaction to overt verbal or non-verbal feedback by the hearer Inferential marking, by contrast, 
may occur as a result of both internal auto-feedback, or external feedback 
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intentions - in spite of the latter's effmts to anticipate them, (ii) participants somehow are 
constantly aware of the possibility of infer entia! mismatch, and (iii) this awareness, reflected in 
their internalised conversational competence, obliges them to mutually assess each others' 
processing of each others' contributions, and if necessary, to re-negotiate the results of the 
inferential processes triggered by them We cannot therefore be satisfied with an idealistic 
themy of conversation that limits itself to accounting for the default case while ignming the 
less immediately obvious but nevertheless by no means infiequent cases where the need for re-
negotiation of inferential targets arises. Inasmuch as strategies of mutual assessment and of re-
negotiation of inferences are part of routine conversational behaviour, they may be expected to 
be conventionalised and, to some extent at least, grammaticalised .. More precisely, it is to be 
expected that the lingrristic apparatus serving the purposes of natural dialogne interaction will 
comprise 
(a) counter-inferential strategies for cancelling 01 weakening inferences which speakers 
assume the hearer has made or is likely to make but which do not match those inferences 
which they would want the hearer to draw fiom some preceding utterance or extraneous 
event; 
(b) inference-supporting strategies fm conveying or strengthening inferences which speakers 
estimate should be made but which in their view the hearer has failed to make or is likely to 
fail to make. 
As a cm ollary to what has been said above about the absence of special marking procedures in 
the default case, we would fiuther expect the occurrence of explicit grammatical marking of 
inferential processes to conelate with a negative marking hierarchy based on the perception by 
the speaker of a discrepancy between himself and the audience in respect to the latter's 
perception of the inferential properties of some communicatively relevant event8 By contrast 
with the matching inference assumption underlying the default case, I propose to call this 
general premise, which I assume to be the rationale behind the surface manifestations of 
inferential marking strategies in natural dialogne, the infer·ential gap condition 9 
Inferential gaps may have different migins .. A fimdamental distinction which will turn out to 
be cmcial for understanding the way inferential operations are expressed in Swalrili is that 
between "first instance" inferential gaps, miginating in the apparent failure of the addressee to 
recognise the source of an inference drawn by the speaker, and "second instance" inferential 
8 The trigger of an inference may be a non-verbal action relevant to a communicative situation or giving 
rise to a verbal exchange See ex (1) below 
9 I he occurrence of an inferential gap may for instance imply that some speech act is retrospectively 
perceived as having not been informative enough. This has nothing to do with the calculated violation of 
Gricean maxims which, in his theory, gives rise to various kinds of implicature While the notion of 
inferential gap does not contradict but rather confirms a fundamentally Gricean view of conversation it 
points nevertheless to the need for extending such a view, in order for it to become more adequate to 
describe naturally occurring dialogue, from individual acts to the accumulated effects of successive moves in 
dialogue sequences. The role of inference in the establishment of sequential coherence has been recognized 
in principle but no coherent linguistically-based methodology seems to be available for describing it. (See 
e.g. Schiitlein-Armbruster (1994:499); but see also Moeschler & Reboul (1994) for some useful criteria) 
The proposals sketched in this section are destined to provide some guidelines to this effect which will then 
be applied to the analysis of relevant Swabili data in the following sections 
GRAMMATICAL MARKERS IN DIALOGUE 5 
gaps resulting from a perceived divergence between speaker and audience regarding the 
derivational pm cess leading from the som ce to the target. Under the premise of "second 
instance" inferential operations, inferential marking strategies presuppose some already 
manifest ( 01 possibly anticipated) inferential process which they are destined to interfere with 
and to modifY; inferential strategies of this kind may appropriately be described as "meta-
inferejltial" 10 We shall tmn to "second instance" operations first in sections 5 and 6 below, and 
then consider "first instance" operations in section 7 
4. Infer·ential op-erators in Swahili 
We are now ready to appmach the main issue of this paper: how are inferential operations 
expressed in Swalrili dialogue? And what type of strategies are represented by the various 
inferential markers? Perhaps closer to the preoccupation of the more practically inclined 
Swalrilist, this paper pmpmts to demonstrate that Swalrili grammar is incomplete without 
taking into account inferential categmies. 
Strategies fm signalling various kinds of inference (and counter-inference) are quite 
numerous in Swalrili as probably in most languages, and I have no intention to even list them 
exhaustively Instead I will limit myself to a restricted subset of inferential operatms which by 
their recmrence and relative detachment from specific lexical contents and specific situations 
may be counted as elements specialised in the grammatical r·epresentation of inferential 
activity. I consider these to constitute so to speak the core paradigm of inferential markers in 
Swalrili11 
ln accordance with the view that the appearance of inferential markers reflects the negative 
marking hierarchy determined by the relevance of inferential gaps, I shall begin by considering 
in section 5 the relatively clear-cut case of counter-inferential marking before tmning in section 
6 to the somewhat less obviously motivated case ofpositive inference marking. 
5. Counter-inferential marking 
The first example is taken from a passage of the play Wakati Ukuta in which Iatu's boyfriend 
Swai comes to her home to take her to the movies (Hussein 1971:14}. He is met with a flat 
refusal from Tatu's mother who clings to traditional views in matters of comtship and 
1° Further relevant distinctions will have to be postulated in terms of the nature of the source, of the 
ascription of inferential operations to various real and construed participants in the communicative process, 
and in terms of particular discourse functions of the inferential operations The variety of conditioning 
factors deriving from these distinctions accounts in a general way for the richness and diversity of the 
inventory of inferential operators in Swahili whose exploration in more detail will however have to be left to 
another occasion See the following footnote for some hints in this respect 
11 Of particular interest to the representation of inferential operations are: conjunction-type operators such 
as maana, yaani, and kwani, but also ten a (see 5 .1 below). Lakini often - but not in all of its uses - carries an 
effect of inference cancellation For yaani see example (16) below 
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maniage In an attempt to prevent her fi om forcibly ejecting Swai fiom their home, I atn 
grasps her by the aim The mother interprets this desperate gestnre as an act of violence 
directed against her [A-1] The daughter protests [B-2] and provides an altemative explanation 
for her interference with the mother's way of dealing with the sitnation [B-3] 
(1) A [1] Ho! unataka kupigana na mimi sasal 
B [2] Sio nagombana nawe, [3] lakini si haki kumfukuza mgeni. 
A [1] So! Are you going to fight with me now! - B [2] I do not attack you (It-is-not l-
ain-fighting-with with-you) [3] but it is not right to chase away a visitor. 
Both [A-1] and [B-2] presuppose a preceding event which is present in the minds of the 
dialogue paitners. This communicatively relevant event (Eo) is the daughter's gesture in 
defence of her fiiend. [A-1] is an inferential statement purporting to explain Eo, [B-2] 
expresses the rejection by the daughter of the validity of [A-1] as being incorrectly inferred 
fiom Eo [B-2] is thus clearly countef-injefential 
Let us look at another scene fiom the saiUe play (Hussein 1971:33) Swai, now Tatn's 
husband, stunned by her refusal to accompany him to the dance, inquires: 
(2) A [1] Jee mbona hivyo? Hupendi densi? - B [2] Sio sipendi. - A [3] Tena? - B [4] 
Hatuwezi kwenda [ .... .] 
A [1] What does this mean? Do you not like to go to dance?- B [2] It-is-not-that I-do-
not-like(-it).- A [3] What then?- B [4] We caimot go 
While Tatn's fust response [B-2] is designed to reject her husband's suggestion that her refusal 
is possibly due to a dislike of dancing, her second response [B-4] initiates a further exchange in 
which it will become clear that the 1eal cause is the strained household budget. 
Looking now at both exaiUples together, two points may be noted: 
1. They provide evidence for the existence of two different negative constructions in Swahili: 
Both in (1) and in (2), sentence [B-2] is introduced by the negative copula expression sio12 
This form differs fiom "ordinary" negation which in ( 1) would have taken the form 
sigombani nawe 'I do not fight against you' I shall refer to the sio negation as extemal, and 
to the si- negation as intema1 
2. In the case of ( 1 ), one might be tempted to consider the two negative forms sio 
nagombana and sigombani as stylistic va~iants of each other, since both serve to reject the 
truth of an identical proposition underlying some previous statement or assumption 
Stylistic variation fails, however, to account for the occurrence of sio in (2), where extemal 
and intemal negation eo-occur. Sipendi taken by itself - translatable as 'I don't like 
(dancing)' - would have to be interpreted as I atn's admittance that her dislike of dancing, as 
her husband had suspected, is the true reason ofher refusal to accompany him. What [B-2] 
- prefixed with sio - in fact does, is to reject precisely this suggestion. At the same time, 
12 One would expect siyo since reference is made to a previously established state of affairs which would 
usually trigger class 9 concord. Although siyo and sio are not identical in pronunciation, it appears that 
literary publishing is not generally too orthodox about distinguishing the two forms 
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however, one gets the impression that the dual negative operator does not necessarily cany 
the same rmge of implications as would a frankly positive statement such as napenda 
sana. 13 
We conclude that the matrix predicate does not only- or perhaps not even necessarily14 - deny 
the factual tmth of the embedded sentence (whether this sentence is affirmative or negative) 
What it does deny is that the embedded sentence is the appmpriate interpretation of some 
preceding event or uttermce relevmt to the cunent situation. One may fmmalise this as 
follows: if Eo is the event, L, the class of possible interpretations of event E0, md (i.,)' -
verbalised as Pa - the interpretation of event Eo by speaker A, then speaker B, by uttt;ring siyo 
p, excludes (i.,)' from the class ofpossible interpretations of event Eo 
5.1 The inferential gap condition in counter-inferentially mar·ked utter·ances 
SUiprisingly however, this description, while being true to the facts, is not sufficiently 
constrained. It would also fit cases where internal negation seems to be sufficient to invalidate 
m inference which is judged to be inappropriate by the speaker.. An example taken from 
mother scene of Wakati Ukuta will serve to make this clear. Some time after Tatu has left her 
parents, a certain Kristina comes to their house intmducing herself as Tatu's friend. The father, 
desperate about his daughter's disappearmce md hallucinated at the mere mention of her 
name, concludes that she herself must be near Then, after a moment, the following exchmge 
t~k-P.!O: nb~P bPh,.VPPn h-im {A\ anA u T;stm'na /n\ tu~H•c<o.~n 1 O'il .,., 1\. v~•~r&~'""- _. ............. ..._._ \£"'-! ..... _._~ ... " \.LIJ\-"-·"-'·1..:3>3 .... ..ll..l _.__..,,_._,~.~..,. 
(3) A [1] Mbona hayupo?- B [2] Sikusema kama yupo nje 
Why is-she-not-here? I-have-not-said that she is outside 
Since mdinary negation seems to be adequate in this case for refuting the inference derived by 
the father from the situation, one may be tempted to revert to the conclusion that after all, 
what has been claimed to be a special categmy of counter-inferential marking is simply some 
smt of a stylistic varimt applicable to one particular use of ordinary negation. That this is not 
the case becomes clear if one looks at the continuation of the respective dialogues While in [3-
2], the denial of the inconect inference - following its verbalisation as a classical 
presupposition tlu ough the question in [3-1] - may perfectly well conclude the exchmge, this is 
13 An explanation in terms of scope correlations which might he suggested by a look at the syntactic 
structure of (I) and (2) similarly fails the test of empirical falsification. Under this hypcthesis, si(y)o, the 
matrix predication, would he used whenever the negator has scope over the whole embedded predication, 
whereas the verb-internal negation wonld serve to negate either the embedded predicate itself or a specific 
constituent dependent on it (here nawe). While such restricted scope negation is among its possible uses, 
sigombam nawe can he quite normally used e g. in order to rule out the possibility of entering in conflict 
with someone, either in a given situation or as a matter of principle, independently of any contextual 
condition suggesting a scope restriction 
14 Delahunty (1995:347) says, with reference to the second of three parts of the complete inferential 
sequence: " the second (which may he a negative inferential) rejects a proposition as either not true or 
not locally relevant; ."(emphasis mine). This would mean that [B-2] in example (2) above would admit 
an alternative reading to the effect that the speaker does indeed dislike dancing but denies this to he the 
reason for her refusal to accompany her husband to the dance I have not been able to ascertain this 
possibility in Swahili 
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not the case of [1-2] nor of [2-2]. Counter-inferential statements characterised by external 
negation require a continuation. [1-2] is somehow incomplete without the sequel of[l-3], and 
[2-2] cannot appropriately close the exchange .. Tena?, uttered by Swai in [2-3] following the 
r~jection by Iatu of his initial attempt to understand her refusal, expresses a clainr for further 
elaboration based on the perceived incompleteness of the exchange up to this point Tatu's 
refusal - the trigger of the inferential process - is still there, requiring an explanation, and 
imposes a fmmal constraint on the sequence, justifying the interlocutor's clainr of which tena? 
appears to be a conventionalised means of expression. By contrast, in (3), the inference made 
by the father is based on a wrong assumption about the purpose ofKristina's coming, and there 
is no need fm the speaker to negotiate an inference based on a presumption which he does not 
share, and hence no sequential constraint obliging him to satisfY such a need by offering a 
substitute for the rt<jected hypothesis.. Thus, we see that the refutation of a (pragmatic) 
presupposition as illustrated in (3), and the refutation of an inference as illustrated in (2-3) are 
by no means the same kind of operation and give rise to two different types of grarmnatical 
strategies, the fmmer requiring internal, the latter external negation 
The cmcial distinguishing factm between (1) and (2) on the one hand, and (3) on the other, 
is that in the fmmer two cases but not in the latter, the inferential gap condition is fulfilled 
Fm it is the mutual recognition of the existence of an inferential gap - ie. the recognition of a 
need fm explanation- which obliges the speaker to offer an alternative to the rejected inference 
as in [1-2], and which, as a corollary, gives the intedocutm the right to request an alternative 
explanation as in [2-3] 
In conclusion, we find our miginal hypothesis confirmed that the occmrence of counter-
inferential marking in Swahili is triggered by the inferential gap condition as its necessary and 
sufficient prerequisite .. We further conclude that counter-inferential marking is linked to 
sequential constraints on dialogue structure which are not found in superficially sinrilar cases of 
rt<iecting pragmatic presuppositions fiom which the criteria! feature of a mutually recognisable 
infer entia! gap is absent 
6. Positive inferential mar·king 
Examples (4) and (5) are taken fiom a scene of the play Mama ee where the younger sister, 
I enge, after having become pregnant, was expelled fiom school She returns home to the 
village, confesses her mistake to her mother and pleads for understanding and forgiveness The 
mother, ignming the plea, concludes (Mwachofi 1987: 10-11): 
( 4) Leo ndiyo babako atatuchinja sote 'Now your father will slaughter all of us!' 
Today it-is your-father he-will-slaugher-us all 
Following further implorations by her daughter she persists: 
(5) [1] Sasa nd?yo utasemwa mwanangul [2] Uso wa kutazama watu utakuwa huna. [3] Ndiyo 
utajua ulimwengu hauna msahama (Mwachofi 1987:11) 
[1] Now it-is you-will-be-gossiped-about my-child, [2] you will no longer dare to show 
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yourself in public, [3] it-is you-will-know the-world it-has-no fmgiveness 
The pmpose of the mother's statements is to bring to the attention of the daughter the sad 
consequences of her mistake which apparently she still refuses to face squarely The effect of 
forcefully bringing home a point is being enhanced by the repetition ofndiyo in [5-1] and [5-3] 
Generally speaking, the effect which ndiyo has on the proposition which it modifies is the 
reverse of that described above for si(y)o. While counter-inferential si(y)o p specifically r~jects 
p as a possible inference fiom E0, ndiyo p specifically asserts p as being the conect inference to 
be drawn fiom Eo, against the background of contrary assumptions expressed by or imputed to 
the audience. 
6.1 The derivational histmy of the infer·ential markers 
From a syntactic viewpoint, ndiyo in ( 4) and [5-1] may be analysed in the same way as the 
copular ndi-construction which expresses contrastive identification 01, more generally, focuses 
on the relation of identity between two elements (Bearth 1995:221ff}. Thus, when Tatu asks 
her mother for permission to go to the movies in the evening, the mother replies (Hussein 
1971: 10): 
(6) Basi si bado? Leo ndio kwanza Ijumaa, "Lady Show" Jumapilz. 
Well-now, already? I oday is ouly Friday; "Lady Show" is on Sunday! 
In contrast to the sentential ndi-focus constmction where the element preceding ndi- is usually 
the focus, while the relativised clause following it is the out-of-focus or presupposed part, 
copular ndi- very often has the identificational predicate following it in its scope Thus in ( 6), 
the focus is I;umaa, the day for which permission is being asked; ljumaa stands in contiast to 
Jumapili, the day fm which permission is supposed to be granted 
As can be seen in a series of similar constructions occmring in a scene of Mama ee, whet e 
Ienge's elder sister proclainis her fieedom fiom her tyrannical husband (Mwachofi 1987:51), 
the slot of the identificational predicate which is filled by a nominal phrase in [7-1] and [7-3], 
may alternatively be occupied by a verbal clause, as is the case in [7-2]: 
(7) [1] Leo ndio mwisho wa utumwa. [2] Leo ndio nimekuwa huru, [3] ndio mwisho wa subira 
yangu 
Today it-is the-end of slavery. Today (it-is) I-have-become fi ee, it -is the-end of submission 
fm-me 
Both fiom a syntactic and fiom a semantic viewpoint, the nominal phrase and the clause are 
fimctionally equivalent. It seems possible, and indeed likely, that inferential ndio, as we observe 
it in (4) and (5) above, is derived fiom the constituent focus marker ndi- via its copular use and 
the rightwards focus pr~jection associated with it Inferential si{y)o, the negative counterpart 
ofndio illustrated in (1) and (2) above, can similarly be traced back to copular si{y)o followed 
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by a sentential identificational predicate15 In the deiivational histmy of the inferential markers. 
functional redundancy is a necessary (although not in itself a sufficient) step in the constitution 
of an autonomous paradigm: the shift from an identificational to an inferential function 
becomes possible when the marker becomes syntactically and (in the case of ndio) semantically 
redundant, i e. when its omission does not affect the propositional meaning or the syntactic 
completeness of the utterance .. 
The pragmatic link between contrastive identification and the inferential effect may be 
exemplified by comparing ( 6) to ( 4) and ( 5}. In each case, ndio takes scope over altemative 
values one of which is asserted while the other is being excluded. In (6), the issue at stake is 
the choice of the appropriate value for the day' to go to the movies .. In (4) and (5), ndio takes 
scope over the sentence as a whole, strengthening its value as the appropriate conclusion to be 
drawn from a preceding event, exchrding thereby the optimistic assumptions manifested in the 
interlocutm's discourse as a valid inference to be drawn from the same event Both cases may 
be described as instances of countervalue .. 16 
6.2 The inferential gap condition in utterances marked for positive infer·ence 
In the following exchange, which is taken from a sample of Islamic courtroom procedures 
discussed by Hanak (1996:35), sentence [8-5], which is clearly inferential, is initiated by ndiyo, 
with no adverbial occurring initially: 17 
(8) A [1]: Umewah1 kusuhulisha na wazee wake?- B [2] Kwa vipi?- A [3] Ugomvi wako na 
mume wako. - A [4] Toka mbali [ .] - B [5] Ndiyo hawakupatanisheni, wazee wenu 
hamjapatanisha kablaya kuja kortini?- A [6] Bado. 
A [1] Did you have his parents mediate?- B [2] In which way?- A [3] The conflict with 
your husband.- A [4] ?Far from it[ .... ]- B [5] So you were not reconciled, your parents 
did not try to reconcile you before you took the matter to the court?- A {6] Not yet. 
In [8-5], the judge draws an inference from the information provided by the plaintiff whom he 
questions about her relationship with her husband and his relatives .. But as her ready consent in 
[8-6] confirms, the content of this inference is not perceived as invalidating some contrary 
assumption held by herself; hence there is no obvious countexvalue effect. The reason for the 
markedness here would seem to be that this conclusion, in the estiniate of the speaker, is not 
likely to be drawn by the plaintiff' on her own The example serves to underline the fact that the 
essential condition for the recourse to inferential marking is not contrastiveness (or 
countervalue) but the perception of an inferential gap .. 
In the particular setting of courtroom interaction, such an inferential gap is not to be 
15 See also Bearth 1995a:223f 
16 Countervalue is defined as the excluded counterpart of an instantiation whose exclusion lies in the scope 
of the illocutory operator. See Bearth (in press) 
17 I have adjusted the display of the sequence to the needs of the present discussion. The translation is 
Hanak's except for [B-4] which, according to Hanak's transcription is uncomplete; the audible part of it is 
translated by her as "From far<++>" 
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counted as a "failme" on the part of the interlocutor but is part of the accepted procedme of 
cross-examination whose pmpose it is to establish truth through elicitation of factual 
statements from parties and wituesses. The person being interrogated is expected to supply 
answers to questions, but is not supposed to draw inferences on her own, this being the 
exclusive privilege of the judge .. The specific frame of comtroom interaction further requires 
that the interrogator is not content with making inferences explicit but seeks to elicit formal 
assent from the persons concerned; this explains why in this case the inference itself takes the 
form of a question addressed to the plaintiff IS 
Let us now look at an example taken from an interview conducted in Zanzibar town in July 
1989 and made available through the Helsinki corpus (Dahe2 1989): 
(9) Unaona, ndiyo ninatumia hiyo ambayo nimefundishwa na Profesa Maganga 
You see, it-is l-am-using that which I-have-been-taught by Professor Maganga .. 
The speaker, an old man, describing some of the differences between standard Swahili and his 
native dialect, points out that not all of the latter's sounds can be represented by using the 
letters of the standard alphabet; at least in one instance a phonetic transcription (as he calls it) 
is being required He thus shows himself knowledgeable in a domain oflearning other than his 
own field of specialization (which is poetry) In a very general way, (9), just like the foregoing 
examples ( 4-8), is a comment on the preceding sequence, but unlike ( 4-8), it is not its 
interpretation. Rather its function is to give the speaker's claim to be in the possession of 
specialized knowledge the necessary amount of credibility by indicating the somce of this 
knowledge (9) relates to the preceding discourse via its explanatory function; the direction of 
the inferential effect is consequently inverted. 
This raises the question of how cases such as (9) should be integrated into our view of 
inferential marking. According to Delahunty (1995:349), explan~tion is one of the typical 
disc our se functions of the inferential construction in English which, in this usage, can be 
paraphrased by the expression The explanation is that p. Other relational meanings associated 
with the English inferential construction observed in a major English corpus by Delahunty 
(1995:355) are 1eason, cause, conclusion, result, and reinterpretation. The common feature of 
all of these uses, according to Delahunty (1995:355), and the feature which constitutes them as 
a "single natural class", is that they "all represent aspects of interpretation [ ..... ] of the local 
context" (ibid.) 
The problem with this definition of inferentials is that it may fit almost any utterance, since 
any non-initial contribution to a coherent discourse or dialogue contains - or is - an 
interpretation of its antecedent. 19 I propose instead the notion of inje1ential gap as a more 
constrained but still sufficiently general local condition covering the various uses of the 
18 I suspect that while positive inferences may be presented conatively in the form of questions, this is not 
possible with counter-inferences introduced by siyo 
19 "Conversation as opposed to monologue, offers the analyst an invaluable analytical resource: as each turn 
is responded to by a second, we find displayed in that second an analysis of the first by the speaker." (Levinson 1983:321) 
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inferential construction The validity of the pwposed inferential gap criterion in a case like (9) 
where there is no perceivable discrepancy between inferences drawn by parties involved in the 
conversation, hinges on an interactionally-based understanding of inferential discomse 
cohesion, i e. on the assmnption that inferability is a pre-condition to the validation by the 
hearer of any overt statement which is part of the discomse and which the hearer is not 
supposed to adhere to on the mere strength of its having been made by the speaker .. A 
simplified version of this axiom could be: For any statement to be acceptable it must be 
inferable. While inferential reasoning is particularly crucial to argumentative discomse whose 
pmported goal is the commitment of the audience to the truth of the claims made by the 
speaker, inferability - as a precondition to plausibility - is also a fundamental requirement of 
other discomse types, e.g. nanative or, as in the case of(9), expository 
We conclude that the common featme which (9) shares with the previous examples, is that 
it is motivated by an inferential gap perceived by the speaker: while in all other matters under 
discussion he is able speak unreservedly on his own authority, the question of dialect 
transcription is outside his recognised competence and thus creates a local context in which the 
need for compensating a gap of infer ability arises; this need is being fu1filled by the inference-
marked utterance 
6.3 Pmsodic pmperties of the marked inferential construction 
An ;d~nt;h..Ying M;t~•;nn "or tho .a~ognrt' r'on or ;-"e·en•r'nl -arK' e·" '" tho'· m· <ogrn•'on m· to n L ......_. .1. "" .L.LJ-'-U. V.l..l. ..... .I..I.V l_~ ..... .I.V\,.1 I. .1. lli.J. .1. :.Lll. aJ. J..Ll .1.;:, .1.,:-, '"-'ll I.W a1...1 Q 
single intonational contour with the remaining part of the sentence in which they are contained 
This appears to be the primary criterion allowing to distinguish them fi om the segmentally 
homophonous answering-particles, in particular ndiyo 'yes'. The latter, by contrast, are realised 
as independent intonation units, terminated by a more or less sharp final fall and usually 
followed by a pause .. 
Examples of the integration of inferential siyo are shown in the graphs on windows 3 and 4 
of Fig. 1 and 2 which visualise the accentual and tonal contours of utterances [B-2] in (1) and 
(2). It is not without interest to note that the intensity contom (window 2, bottom riglrt) does 
not eo-vary with the tonal melody 20 The latter appears to be primarily responsible for the 
structmal unity, while the former serves purposes of contrastive focus marking 
6.4 Structural ambiguity 
I conclude this section with an example, gleaned fiom Wakati Ukuta, which raises some 
interesting questions as to its interpretation. Tatu's father, retmning home, finds that his 
20 I he data were recorded under non-sound-proof conditions on Sony Digital Audio Tape Recorder TCD-
D7 and processed on PC-Windows with the help ofthe CECIL Speech Analysis software version 2 lb (Hunt 
1995) The graphs are extracts from re-enactments of dialogue sequences performed together by a female 
and a male speaker, respectively Mwanaisha J Khamis and Salim A Rashid, both in their early thirties, 
and both of them speakers ofPemba dialect. Fig .. 4 was recorded during a discussion about various passages 
of Wakati Ukuta with A M Mzee (about 50) from Mombasa 
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daughter has gone, expelled from their home by her mother He asks his wife about the reasons 
fm her drastic action (Hussem 1971: 15): 
(10) A [1] Una maana kwamba eh sijaelewa. Wewe Ah [2] Umemjuk:uza Tatu, [3] 
maana yake asije hapa tena? 
B [4] Ndivo sitaki kumtia machoni tena; [5] sina mtoto mie 
A [1] You are-of-the-opiirion that eh !-have-not-yet-understood. You ... ah. [2] You-
have-chased-away Tatu, [3] does-this mean she-should-not-come here agam? 
B [4] Ifs-because/Yes, I-don't-want to-put-her m-my-eyes agaiii. (=I don't want to see her 
agaiii.) [5] 1-do-not-have a-child as-fm-me. 
Ndiyo m [10-4] is amenable to two competmg mterpretations .. It can be read as an iiiferential of 
the explanatmy type (similar to (9) above), 01 as a straightfmward affumative answer to the 
question m [10-3] Under the fust assumption, [10-4] as a whole would be mtended to provide 
the cue allowiiig the puzzled father to fill the iiiferential gap manifested thi ough the 
disconnectedness ofhis speech throughout the sequence (10-[1-3]) .. In favour ofthis reading it 
could be argued that from a cultural viewpomt, the wife, bemg confronted with a very negative 
situation for which she is held responsible by her husband, would avoid the kind of directness 
embodied m a fum and somewhat provocative "Yes (she must never come home)", and resmt 
mstead to restatmg her negative feeliiigs agamst her daughter, leavmg it to her husband tO 
draw the necessary conclusions. Ndiyo would then be another mstance of the use of iiiferential 
markers fm the pm pose of cohesiveness .. That ( 10) m deed 1 epresents this use of ndiyo could 
be confumed if it could be ascertamed that the absence of a connna after ndiyo is mtended by 
the authm. 
However, agamst this mterpretation it must be said that two native speakers who, at two 
different occasions, were asked to 1 ead the sequence, clearly opt m fuvour of the second 
mteipl etation according to which ndiyo is hei e to be taken as an mstance of the affumative 
answe1mg-particle That this is their spontaneous mte1pretation of [1 0-4] can be read off the 
sonag~arns m Fig .. 3 and 4 .. In both cases, [10-4] carries two distiiict mtonation contoms, as 
shown by the mtenupted trace of the Fo contom m wiiidows 3 and 4 (on the tight side), the 
first extending over ndiyo, the second over the remaining pa1t of the sentence The two 
segments are separated by a clearly noticeable pause of about 2-3/10 sec .. as shown by the dmp 
of the mtensity parameter to zew m wiiidow 1. This may be contrasted with Fig. 5 which 
shows the mteg~ated contom of (5-3), where sentence-iiritial ndiyo unquestionably has 
inferential meaning. 21 
As a further confirmation, both speake1s, when asked to comment on the meaning of [1 0-4], 
msisted that it is to be 1 ead as a direct affumative answer to the husband's question 
21 The contrast is somewhat blurred by the tendency, noticeable in both tokens of [I 0-4], to separately 
articulate all the major syntactic constituents of the utterance The resulting discontinuities in the second 
part of the utterance are however due to performance factors, i.e. in Fig 3, to a hesitation, and in Fig. 4, to 
an effort made by the speaker to compensate for the analyst's apparent failure to fully understand the 
meaning of the utterance. That the rupture following ndiyo is not to be discounted on the ground of 
performance variation is however clear from its consistency and neatness, and was moreover claimed 
explicitly by A M. Mzee in reviewing the example 
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Nonetheless, the question as to which of the two interpretations is really intended remains 
open 
7. "First instance" inferential marking 
The discussion of what may be seen as the core paradigm of inference markers in Swahili 
would be incomplete without considering a third type of inferential operator appearing in the 
same position as the two preceding ones, and being equally derived fiom the paradigm of 
copular expressions. Sentence-initial si, like ndiyo, is redundant in regard to the truth value and 
other propositional properties of the embedded sentence over which its scope extends, but it 
differs fiom both ndiyo and siyo in respect to the conditions under which it occurs Whereas 
the latter two markers presuppose some so~t of deductive reasoning, si marks an inference 
triggered by what the speaker considers to be inrmediate evidence available to himself and to 
the hearer The first example is a remark ofMarna Tatu, addressed to her daughter, at the sight 
of the latter's provokingly short dress (Hussein 1971:9): 
(11) Si unatembea uchi hivyo 
! you-are-going naked like-this 
As Tenge's father- in a scene following the encounter with her mother described in (4) and (5) 
above - unlashes his :fury against the daughter, fulfilling her mother's prediction (see ( 4) above), 
her brother, unaware at first of his sister's misdeed, attempts to interfere. The father simply 
points to the evidence (Mwachofi 1987: 12): 
(12) Si limepachikwa mimba na George 
! she-has-let-herself-make-pregnant by George 
After having joined his father in beating her, he pauses and asks her (Mwachofi 1987: 13): 
(13) Walilia nini? Si umepata ulichotaka .. 
What do-you-cry? ! You-got what-you-wanted! 
Failure to notice the evidence itself; and failure to draw the right conclusion fiom the evidence 
are not strictly separable as conditioning factors in the use of preposed si in these examples In 
example (14), taken fiom the play Buriani, the evidence invoked by Eda to counter her 
brother-in-law's accusation ofdiscrinrinating him when he came to visit his brother after having 
been released fiom prison, provides a classical example for the way in which si is being used 
under the inferential gap condition (Yahya/Mulwa 1983:32): 
(14) A [1] Nataka kwanza unikaribishe kwa heshima na adabu, shemejiyangu - B [2] Sasa si 
nimeshakukaribisha? [3] Si nimekufungulia mlango ukaingia ndani 
A [1] I-want first-of-all that-you-welcome-me with respect and kindrress, my sister-in-law 
- B [2] Now, is-it-not-the-case-that I-have-aheady-welcomed-you? [3] Is-it-not-the-case-
that I-have-opened-to-you the-door and-you-have-entered inside? 
I he common characteristic of these examples is that they encode an appeal to the hearer, not 
to modifY incorrect inferential reasoning, but to perceive or to accept evidence accessible to 
him or her which will lead him/her to the right conclusion, and will, in the speaker's estinration, 
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orient the dialogue towards the desired state of matching inferences 
The pmposed desctiption of inferential si conesponds roughly to the one proposed for 
Japanese no desu. In contrast with the English inferential construction, the Japanese equivalent 
no desu may occur, as Kuno (1973:233) notes "in the innnediate environment in which the 
speaker has made some observation"22, where the observed fact serves as an argument or an 
explanation for some other fact This is- apart fiom the politeness factor which seems to play a 
mle in Japanese but not in Swahili- exactly the condition under which sip occurs 
In contrast with siyo, sip is not compatible with negated p: We find siyo Neg-p (cf (2) 
above) but not *si Neg-p In this respect, the sip construction is analogous to inteno-negative 
rhetorical questions, and one may be tempted to consider it simply as a variety of them. 
However, available data concerning intonational characteristics of si p - see Fig .. 6 and 7 for 
acoustic co11elates respectively of (11) and (12)- show no conclusive evidence of the strong 
rise-and-fall final contour typical of factual questions in Swahili There seems to be a noticeable 
tendency to interrupt the intonation contour at the boundary between the initial copula-derived 
si and the embedded sentence following it23 
On the other hand, the sip construction must be distinguished fiom the negative tag question 
in terms of the respective fimctions of the two constructions in dialogue: 
(15) Wanitukana siyo? 'You are insulting me, aren't you?' (Mwachofi 1987:3) 
Utterances (11) and (15)- to take these two cases as a basis for comparison- may both be 
considered to be injunctions addressed to the interlocutor obliging hinr or her to ratifY an 
evidence (fiom which- at least in an argumentative context- some conclusion will follow). But 
they differ fiom each other by the degree of imposition on the hearer. While sip imposes the 
truth ofp, p siyo is, at least pro forma, a request addressed to the hearer to consent to the 
truth ofp 
9. Conclusion 
As Delahunty ( 1995 :341£) points out, the type of construction which he pmposes to call 
inferential (I have followed hinr in this respect), appears to be rmiversal, yet has received so fin 
SIIIprisingly little attention fiom linguists. One reason for its under exploration may be its low 
textual fiequency, as Delahunty himself notes on the basis of a perusal of a large English 
corpus Our findings obtained on the basis of a much more limited and somewhat randomly 
selected sample fiom Swahili do not authorize an independent judgment regarding its overall 
fiequency in this language, let alone in the world's languages in general However, if our 
22 Quoted from Delahunty (1995: 51) 
23 Contrary to an earlier hypothesis based on Fig. 6, intonational discontinuity does not seem to be tied to 
the glottal onset triggered by the sentence-initial vowel and functioning as a boundary marker at the 
transition between si and the following part of the sentence, but also occurs regularly before consonantal 
onset Unfortunately, the intensity of si in Fig 7 is too low to allow it to appear on the screen 
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central hypothesis regarding the specific discomse environment which triggers its occmrence is 
conect, any judgment regarding its fiequency and relevance will have to made on account of 
the type of verbal interaction in which controversial negotiation of inferences typically occms. 
In other words, its fiequency and, more importantly, the attention which it will be given appear 
to be tied to a recognition of the prinracy of a dialogue-analytical approach and methodology in 
the study of natural language 
Comparative evidence suggests that the grammatical representation of inferential operations 
via a copula-derived operator having in its scope the embedded inferential proposition is by no 
means unique to Swahili However, our exploration of the Swahili facts has also made it clear 
that the autonomous paradigm of inferential operators derived fiom a possibly similar 
syntactico-semantic somce may vary considerably fiom language to language .. In regard to 
what I have tentatively identified as the core paradigm of inferential operators in Swahili, 
morpho-semantic and discomse-fimctional evidence points to a three-way contrast reflecting 
the distinction between negatively vs. positively oriented meta-inferential activity on the one 
hand and, within the class of inference-supporting strategies only, between operations directed 
at the somce vs. operations directed at the target of the inferential processus on the other 
hand 
While starting out fiom a basically Gticean approach as point of departme for om study of 
the discomse fimctions of the inferential construction, we are at variance with Delahunty when 
he says (Ioc. cit.) that its "characteristics can be accounted for by Gtice's cooperative principle 
( CP) and maxims of conversation". Tne key concept of "inferential gap" epitomises the type of 
extended conversational pragmatics needed in order to accommodate constraints on dialogal 
sequences mediated by inferential and meta-inferential operations. While the description of the 
inferential construction in terms of its syntactic, semantic and intonational properties remains a 
necessary prerequisite to understanding its specificity, the infer entia! gap condition has proved 
to be the key to a fimctional explanation taking into account the interplay of communicative 
roles reflected in the whole spectrum of its various uses. 
Ihe present study, being limited to establishing the copula-derived inferential paradigm, 
should not be taken as representing in any sense a complete view of inference processing and 
negotiation in Swahili. An example taken fiom the interview "Dahe2" will serve to give just a 
glimpse of the kind offiuther extrapolations of the core system which would have to be taken 
into account in a more fully representative view: 
(16) A [1] Enhl Wavuvi, A'a, wavuvi hawana nyimbo. B [2] Yaani, huenda wakasitikasikitika 
wakati 
A [1] Well! fishermen, no, fishermen don't have songs.- B [2] So you are saying, perhaps 
they are always sad at the time when (they are at work?) 
Ihe interviewer (B) had suggested that fishermen, just like farmers, have their songs which 
they sing dming work The old man (A) denies this B then manifests his unbeliefby exposing 
what he estinrates to be the impossible consequence of A's denial .. The inference here is not the 
one which the speaker himself is supporting; rather he explicates an inference which he 
estinrates the interlocutor should have made but failed to do so, given his on-record stance on 
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the su~ject matter under discussion. The markets used to characterize [B-2] - yaam m 
combination with the sequential marker -ka- - may well be typical if not mandatory for 
representing this type of counter-argumentative use ofinference24 
The aim of this study has been to shed some light on a largely unexplored area of Swalrili 
grammar. At the same time, it has been an attempt to contribute some working hypotheses and 
criteria for a better understanding of the role of inference in the construction of cohesion in 
discourse and dialogue. I hope to have indicated some directions for further fruitful exploration 
of avast and fascinating field of research which, as I hope to have shown, is of considerable 
interest even beyond the immediate concerns of grammar and discourse analysis 
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Appendix 
The sonagrarns (Fig 1-7 below) contain four parts (windows): 
- on the left upper half (window 1 ): oscillogram permitting to identifY the segmental stmcture 
of the utterance; 
- on the left lower half (window 2): intensity graph (measurements in dbel) 
- on the right side: fundamental frequency g~aph (Fo) in fraw (window 3) and smooth contom 
(window4) 
The vertical cursor line is positioned at the end of the inferential marker or particle 
ndiyo/siyolsi so as to facilitate observation of the transitional featmes between it and the 
embedded sentence 
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S. ..•. ............... iyo nagombana nawe Siyo nagombana nawe 
Fig .. 1: Example (l/B2) Female speaker.: M. Khamis 
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/ r .. 
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Sio sipendi Sio sipendi 
Fig. 2: Example (2/B2) Female speaker.: M. Khamis 
19 
20 THOMAS BEARJH 
. ' .. , .,..._. . 
. • "f't ' - .... 
,, .. " """~ ~ ~-~ 
\i"'' ! ~ 
,, 
· . 
• " f :- • · .. " 
lnOsecs 
Ndiyo sitaki kumtia machoni (tena) Ndiyo 5itaki kumtia machoni (tena) 
Fig. 3: Example (I O/B4} Female speaker: M.. Kharnis 
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Nt#yo 5itaki kumtia macho(ni tena) Nt#yo sitaki kumtia macho(ni tena) 
Fig. 4: Example(IO/B4) Male speaker: A M. Mzee 
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[tllllsecs[ 
Ndi.yo utajua ulimwent:Jilrauna msalranuz Ndiyo utajua ulimwent:Jilrauna msalranuz 
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Fig. 5: Example (5/3). Female speaker: M. Khamis 
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Si unatembea uchi hivyo 
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Si unatembea uchi lrivyo 
Fig .. 6: Example (11) Female speaker M. Khamis 
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.7S4secs lllOsees 
Si limepachikwa na George Si limepachikwa na George 
Fig .. 7: Example (12) Male speaker S ARashid 
